Recently, a chaos-based image encryption algorithm called MCKBA (Modified Chaotic-Key Based Algorithm) was proposed. This paper analyzes the security of MCKBA and finds that it can be broken with a differential attack, which requires only four chosen plain-images. Performance of the attack is verified by experimental results. In addition, some defects of MCKBA, including insensitivity with respect to changes of plain-image/secret key, are reported.
Introduction
Rapid development of information technology and popularization of digital products require that multimedia data are transmitted over all kinds of wired/wireless networks more and more frequently. Therefore, secure delivery of multimedia data becomes increasingly important. However, traditional text encryption schemes fail to be competent for the task due to the big differences between textual and multimedia data. Under the pressure of this challenge, researchers attempted to propose special multimedia encryption schemes utilizing all kinds of nonlinear theories in the past decade. The subtle similarity between chaos and cryptography makes chaos considered as an ideal tool to design secure and efficient encryption schemes and a great number of multimedia encryption schemes based on it have been presented [Chen & Yen, 2003; Chen et al., 2004; Pisarchik et al., 2006; Xiang et al., 2007; Ye, 2010; Wong et al., 2010] . Unfortunately, many of them have been found to be insecure and/or incomplete from the viewpoint of modern cryptology [Wang et al., 2005; Li et al., 2008b,a; Arroyo et al., 2008; Zhou & Au, 2008; Ercan & Cahit, 2009; Li et al., 2009b,a; Solak et al., 2010] . References [Álvarez & Li, 2006; Li et al., 2004] conclude some general rules about evaluating the security of chaos-based encryption schemes.
In [Yen & Guo, 2000] , a chaotic key-based algorithm (CKBA) for image encryption was proposed. The algorithm encrypts each pixel by four possible operations: XORing or XNORing it with one of two predefined sub-keys. A pseudo-random number sequence (PRNS), obtained from a one-dimensional chaotic system, is used to determine which operation is exerted. As shown in [Li & Zheng, 2002] , CKBA can be easily broken with only one known/chosen-image. To enhance security of CKBA against known/chosenplaintext attack, [Rao & Gangadhar, 2007] proposes a modified chaotic-key based algorithm (MCKBA) by employing a modular addition operation like [Socek et al., 2005] . To further enhance the security against brute-force attack, [Gangadhar & Rao, 2010] replaces the one-dimensional chaotic system generating PRNS with a simple hyperchaos generator proposed in [Takahashi et al., 2004] and names the algorithm HCKBA (Hyper Chaotic-Key Based Algorithm). Since the two schemes MCKBA and HCKBA share the same structure, this paper only analyzes the security of MCKBA and finds that the scheme can be broken with only four chosen plain-images. Both theoretical analysis and experimental results are provided to support the conclusion. In addition, some other security defects of MCKBA, including insensitivity with respect to changes of plain-image/secret key, are discussed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The image encryption algorithm under study is introduced in Sec. 2. Detailed cryptanalysis on the algorithm is presented in Sec. 3 with experimental results. The last section concludes this paper.
Modified Chaotic-Key Based Algorithm (MCKBA)
The plaintext encrypted by MCKBA is a gray-scale image of size M × N (width×height). The plain-image is scanned in the raster order and represented as a 1D signal
. Then, a binary sequence
is constructed, where
is generated for encryption, where
Note that sequence I b is padded with some zero bits if (8M N ) is not a multiple of n. Without loss of generality, assume n can divide (8M N ) here. MCKBA operate on the intermediate sequence J and get
is obtained, where
With the above notations, MCKBA can be described as follows 1 .
• The secret key: two random numbers key 1 , key 2 ∈ {0, · · · , 2 n − 1}, and the initial condition x(0) ∈ (0, 1) of the following chaotic Logistic map:
where n−1 j=0 (key 1,j ⊕ key 2,j ) = ⌈n/2⌉, key 1 = n−1 j=0 key 1,j · 2 j , key 2 = n−1 j=0 key 2,j · 2 j , and ⊕ denotes eXclusive OR (XOR) operation.
• Initialization: run the chaotic system to generate a chaotic sequence,
. From the 32-bit binary representation of
is determined by the following rule:
where
• Decryption: the decryption procedure is similar to that of the encryption, but with Eq. (3) replaced by following
3. Cryptanalysis
The Differential Attack
Differential attack is usually a chosen-plaintext attack, assuming that the attacker can obtain cipertexts for some set of chosen plaintexts. The goal of the attack is to gain information about the secret key or plaintext by analyzing how differences in the chosen plaintexts affect the resultant difference at the corresponding ciphertexts. Note that difference is defined with respect to any given operation, e.g., XOR. In [Rao & Gangadhar, 2007, III.B] and [Gangadhar & Rao, 2010, Sec. 3 .2], the authors claimed that MCKBA is very robust against chosen-plaintext attack. However, we will show how it can be broken very easily with only four chosen plain-images. Since plain-image and intermediate sequences J can be obtained from each other without any secret key, choosing the former is actually equivalent to choosing the latter. If two known intermediate sequences
are encrypted with the same secret key, their corresponding encrypted results
satisfy the following relation
Regardless the value of
where a, b, x, y ∈ {0, · · · , 2 n − 1}. The following theorem discusses how to solve the above equation. Proof. First, rewrite Eq. (6) as the following equivalent form
Let
where i ∈ {0, · · · , n − 2}, c 0 = 0,c 0 = 0. 
2 ) ∈ {1, 2, 4, 7}. 
When n = 1, Eq. (7) becomesỹ ≡ 0. So, no pair of (a, b) is required to achieve the value of x. Sincẽ y n−1 bears no relation with x n−1 , we only need to discuss how to obtain the (n − 1) least significant bits of x for other values of n.
• n = 2: Sinceỹ 0 = 0, c 0 = 0, one can get Table 1 , it can be easily verified that there is no (a, b) and (a ′ , b ′ ) satisfying either Eq. (9) or (a
for i = 1, 2. This means x 2 cannot always be determined. Therefore, we need one more
n−1 j=0ỹ ⋆ j · 2 j denote the corresponding output with respect to Eq. (7). Given a set of (
and value of x i+k , where i, k ∈ Z. Let arrows of plain head and "V-back" head denote x i+k = 0 and x i+k = 1 respectively, Figure 1 illustrates mapping relationship between (c i+k ,
, the dashed arrows in Fig. 1 describe Eq. (8) with the three sets of (a, b) for i = 0, 1, 2. Note that the data in the fourth column of the table shown in Fig. 1 is exactly the same as the first one. Therefore, Fig. 1 shows calculation of Eq. (7) under all different bit levels if the variable i shown in Fig. 1 go through 3 · t, where t = 0 ∼ ⌊n/3⌋ and i + k ≤ n − 1. From  Fig. 1 , it can be easily verified that the following relationship 
01 01 11 11 10 00
with the following three sets of numbers
and checking the correspondingỹ = y ⊕ a ⊕ b.
Proof. The proof is straightforward.
Proposition 1. Assume that a and x are both n-bit integers, n ∈ Z + , one has the following two equations
Proof. Eq. (12) can be proved under four conditions. i) When (a ⊕ x) ≥ 2 n−1 and x ≥ 2 n−1 :
Similarly, Eq. (12) can be proved. 
With respect to the 1D representation of 2D images defined in Sec. 2, basic repeated pattern of the corresponding gray-scale images of J 0 , J 1 , J 2 and J 3 are [73, 146, 36] , [255, 255, 255] , [36, 73, 146] , [182, 109, 219] , respectively. As shown in Proposition 1, the unknown most significant bits of key 1 and/or key 2 have no influence on decryption of MCKBA, so they are considered being recovered correctly in rest of the paper. Let key * (i) denote solution of Eq. (5) 
can be used as an equivalent key to decrypt any cipher-images of smaller size, encrypted with the same secret key.
The complexity of the differential attack is mainly determined by verifying the n−1 bits of each element in {key
from Table 3 .1, so the complexity is proportional to the size of the plain-image.
Breaking the Secret Key
The differential attack described in the above subsection only outputs an equivalent key. We will show that the secret key can be further derived from it.
Assume {b(l)} distributes over {0, 1} uniformly, the probability key 1 ∈ (key * (i))
or key 2 ∈ (key * (i))
is (1/2) 8M N/n . So, we can obtain set (key 1 , key 2 ) with a very high probability 1 − (1/2) 8M N/n−1 . Since n−2 j=0 (key 1,j · 2 j ) = n−2 j=0 (key 2,j · 2 j ), one can narrow the scope of B(i) from Eq. (5) as follows
where key * (i) = n−1 j=0 (key * (i) j · 2 j ) and key * (i) = n−1 j=0 (key * (i) j · 2 j ).
Proposition 2. Assume that a and x are both n-bit integers, n ∈ Z + , if a is odd, then p = ((a ∔ x) ⊕ x) is always odd and q = ((a ∔ x) ⊙ x) is always even.
Proof. This proposition can be proved by two equations
From Proposition 2 and Eq. (2), one can narrow the scope of B(i) also according to encryption result of the second chosen intermediate sequence shown in Eq. (12), as follows
Once key 1 and key 2 are determined, value of B(i), for i = 0 ∼ 8M N/n − 1, can be determined exactly from Eq. (13) corresponding to the two combinations of key 1 and key 2 . Since Eq. (14) is unrelated with key 1 and key 2 , one can assure that
, where
come from consecutive chaotic states generated by iterating Logistic map, we can distinguish {x
is the right sequence controlling encryption process, and verify key 1 and key 2 correspondingly, by checking whether any two consecutive elements of them satisfy specific correlation. As shown in [Rao & Gangadhar, 2007, Table 3 ], Eq. (1) is realized in 32-bit fixed-point arithmetic precision. So MCKBA satisfies condition described in Proposition 3. The whole secret key of MCKBA can be verified by checking whether some consecutive elements in {x
satisfy Eq. (15). Finally, key 1 , key 2 , and x(0) = 32 j=1 b(j − 1) · 2 j can be recovered. For HCKBA, we have to check which sequence agrees with distribution of the chaotic states generated by the hyperchaos generator like [Gangadhar & Rao, 2010, Fig. 6 ]. 
Proof. See appendix of [Li et al., 2008b] .
Experimental Results
To verify the real performance of the above analysis, some experiments are carried out on some plain-images of size 512×512 when n = 32. The four chosen plain-images are shown in Fig. 2 . When x 0 = 319684607/2 32 , key 1 = 3835288501, and key 2 = 1437224678, the encryption results of the four chosen-image are shown in Fig. 3 . Equivalent key {key
is used to decrypt another cipher-image shown in Fig. 4a ) and the recovered result is shown in Fig. 4b ). Three parts of the whole secret key, key 1 , key 2 and the 32 bits of x(0) can be verified by checking only three pairs of consecutive elements in {x
Some Remarks on the Performance of MCKBA
• Insufficient randomness of PRBS {b(l)} It is well-known that distribution of chaotic states generated by iterating Logistic map is not uniform, which makes randomness of derived binary bit sequence from them very low. As this point has been shown quantitatively in [Li et al., 2007 [Li et al., , 2010 , detailed discussion is omitted here.
• Insensitivity with respect to changes of plain-image This defect may cause serious threat for any secure image encryption algorithm since image and its watermarked version may be encrypted at the same time. From Eq. (2), one can see that change of the m-th significant bit of J(i) may only change the m ∼ (n − 1)-th significant bits of J ′ (i), where 0 ≤ m < n. This means MCKBA can make change of one bit of plain-image to influence at most n bits in the corresponding cipher-image.
• Insensitivity with respect to changes of two sub-keys Obviously, any secure encryption algorithm should avoid this defect. Unfortunately, MCKBA is seriously fragile in this aspect. From Eq. (2), one can see that change of one bit of key 1 or key 2 only influences one bit of the corresponding cipher-image.
Conclusion
In this paper, security of the image encryption algorithm MCKBA has been studied in detail. It was found that the whole secret key can be recovered correctly with only four chosen plain-images. In addition, some other defects of the algorithm, including insensitivity with respect to changes of plain-image/secret key, were discussed. Analogue of MCKBA, HCKBA, have the same security problems. Due to such a low level of security provided by the two schemes (essentially one scheme), their application in practice should be performed with extreme caution. 
